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 HON. JILL A. PRYOR* 
In the summer of 2015, when the Supreme Court declared un-
constitutional a law that dictated lengthy terms of incarceration for 
certain repeat offenders,1 the Eleventh Circuit and other federal 
courts across the country were tasked with interpreting that decision 
and applying it to individual cases.  Of course, this task falls 
squarely within the core functions of the lower federal courts.  But 
what we faced in 2016 was rather unique: Immediately following 
the Supreme Court’s decision, we received scores of requests for 
relief from inmates potentially affected by the decision.2  Our review 
of these requests brought into vivid relief the impact of our work on 
the lives of individuals who populate our Circuit. 
In the landmark decision of Johnson v. United States, the Su-
preme Court held that the so-called “residual clause” of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”),3 a statute that imposes a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 15 years for individuals with certain prior 
criminal convictions, was unconstitutionally void for vagueness.4  
                                                                                                             
 *  Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. I thank my 
law clerks, Bradley Silverman, Elizabeth Eager, and Lauren Caudill, as well as 
Anta Plowden and the editorial board of the University of Miami Law Review, 
for their invaluable assistance. 
 1 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), federal inmates have one year from the date 
that the Supreme Court initially recognizes a new right in which to file a 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 motion. 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Under ACCA, an individual convicted of unlawful 
possession of a firearm who has three previous convictions “for a violent felony 
or a serious drug offense, or both,” is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence 
of 15 years’ imprisonment. Id. § 924(e)(1). ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” 
included the now-void “residual clause,” which defined an offense as a violent 
felony if it “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical in-
jury to another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 4 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 
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This ruling left no doubt that some persons sentenced under the re-
sidual clause—namely, those whose direct appeals were pending—
could pursue relief from their ACCA enhanced sentences.5  How-
ever, the Supreme Court’s decision necessarily was limited to the 
facts and procedural posture of Mr. Johnson’s case.  Federal courts, 
including the Eleventh Circuit, devoted extraordinary effort to eval-
uating the breadth of Johnson’s ruling and sorting out who might 
benefit from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement.  Faced with an 
unprecedented number of applications from federal inmates seeking 
relief under Johnson,6 our Court analyzed issues such as whether: 
Johnson applies to cases on collateral review (yes);7 the similarly-
worded career offender enhancement in the Sentencing Guidelines 
also is unconstitutionally vague (no);8 the similarly-worded en-
hancement in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague 
(maybe);9 and an inmate’s request for authorization to file a second 
                                                                                                             
 5 Id. 
 6 In 2016 we reviewed 2,108 Johnson-based requests for authorization to file 
second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions (“RFAs”)—by far the most com-
mon vehicle for a Johnson-based claim in this Circuit. In June of 2016 alone, over 
1,000 RFAs were filed. These 2,108 Johnson-based RFAs constituted 26.2% of 
all Eleventh Circuit cases initiated in 2016. By contrast, in 2015 RFAs of all kinds, 
numbering 446, constituted a mere 7.3% of all cases opened in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit that year. I thank Deputy Clerk of Court Amy Nerenberg and Statistical An-
alyst Michael Pizarek of the Eleventh Circuit Clerk’s Office for providing these 
statistics. 
 7 Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728, 728 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
Johnson’s rule applies retroactively to first § 2255 motions). Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court held that Johnson’s rule applies retroactively to second or succes-
sive § 2255 motions. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). 
 8 United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that the advisory guidelines cannot be void for vagueness), reh’g en banc denied, 
837 F.3d 1118, 1119 (11th Cir. 2016); see also In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350, 1354 
(11th Cir. 2016) (extending Matchett’s holding to conclude that the formerly man-
datory guidelines cannot be void for vagueness). The Supreme Court recently 
agreed with our Court’s holding in Matchett. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. 
Ct. 886 (2017). As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence in the judgment, 
Beckles did not answer whether individuals sentenced under the mandatory guide-
lines before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005), could attack their sentences as void for vagueness. See id. at 903 n.4 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment). In our Circuit, Griffin still controls this 
issue. 
 9 In re Pinder, 824 F.3d 977, 978 (11th Cir. 2016); see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (imposing a mandatory five-year sentence, to run consecutively to 
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or successive § 2255 motion may be granted even though it was filed 
more than one year after Johnson was decided (yes).10  We also ad-
dressed whether certain crimes may serve as predicate convictions 
for an ACCA enhancement after Johnson’s striking of the residual 
clause from the statute: Florida burglary (no),11 Georgia burglary 
(yes),12 South Carolina burglary (no),13 Florida felony battery 
(yes),14 and Florida armed robbery with a firearm (yes).15  These are 
but some of the many issues we decided in the wake of Johnson. 
Our work on Johnson-related cases had a significant impact.16  
With the unconstitutional portion of their sentences now void, some 
inmates in our Circuit were resentenced to significantly lower terms 
of imprisonment.17  Others, having paid their debt to society by serv-
ing the entirety of their lawful sentences, were released from federal 
penitentiaries.18 
Although Johnson issues undoubtedly commanded significant 
attention in 2016, we also decided a wide range of other important 
civil and criminal matters.  With respect to the scope of religious 
accommodations, we decided that inmates of state prisons whose 
                                                                                                             
any other sentence imposed, for use of a firearm during a “crime of violence,” the 
definition of which includes a residual clause). 
 10 In re Jackson, 826 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2016). In Jackson, we held that the 
one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) will not factor into 
our decision whether to grant an inmate permission to seek relief based on John-
son in the district court. 
 11 United States v. Esprit, 841 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 12 United States v. Gundy, 842 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 13 United States v. Lockett, 810 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 14 United States v. Green, 842 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 15 United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 16 For example, burglary frequently serves as a predicate offense for an 
ACCA enhanced sentence, and it is among the most common crimes of conviction 
for incarcerated persons in our Circuit. Our decisions analyzing whether convic-
tions under state burglary statutes can serve as ACCA predicates after Johnson 
thus stand to have a substantial impact on numerous federal inmates in Alabama, 
Georgia, and Florida. See Gundy, 842 F.3d at 1179 (Jill Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 17 Without the 15-year ACCA enhancement, the maximum term of incarcer-
ation for these inmates is 10 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 
 18 See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, No. 16-CV-22649-UU, 2016 WL 
7756625, at *11-12 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2016); Brand v. United States, No. 8:16-
CV-1799-T-30TGW, 2016 WL 4247912, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2016); Battle 
v. United States, No. 2:16-CV-471-WKW, 2016 WL 3946779, at *2 (N.D. Ala. 
July 20, 2016). 
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sincerely held religious beliefs require them to keep kosher are en-
titled to kosher meals under the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act.19  We issued a trio of decisions addressing the 
scope and substance of rights under the federal employment dis-
crimination laws, holding that the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act does not create a disparate impact cause of action for job 
applicants as opposed to employees;20 that an employer who re-
scinded a job offer to a candidate who refused to cut her dreadlocks 
did not discriminate on the basis of race within the meaning of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;21 and that, when examining Ti-
tle VII claims for adverse employment actions taken based on a mix 
of lawful and unlawful motives, the employee need only show that 
the employer took an adverse employment action against her and 
that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the adverse 
action, instead of having to satisfy the widely used McDonnell-
Douglas burden shifting framework.22  The second of these cases, 
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, is the subject of one 
of the articles in this issue. 
Our Court also clarified the scope of the Security and Exchange 
Commission’s enforcement authority and the manner by which par-
ties subject to enforcement actions can challenge that authority.23  In 
                                                                                                             
 19 See United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1341, 1343-44 
(11th Cir. 2016). 
 20 See Villareal v. R.J. Reynolds, 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016) (en 
banc). 
 21 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., No. 
14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059, at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). 
 22 Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 23 See Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1237 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a re-
spondent in an SEC administrative enforcement action cannot file a collateral 
challenge to the proceeding’s constitutionality in district court without first adju-
dicating its claim in the proper administrative forum); SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 
1357, 1362-64 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the five-year statute of limitations 
on government lawsuits to enforce “any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,” 28 
U.S.C. § 2462, applies to actions for declaratory relief and disgorgement, but not 
to actions seeking injunctions). The Supreme Court recently agreed with our hold-
ing that § 2462’s statute of limitations applies to claims for disgorgement. See 
Kokesh v. SEC, No. 16-529, 2017 WL 2407471 (U.S. June 5, 2017). The issue in 
Hill may also one day reach the Supreme Court because the circuits are split on 
the question. Compare Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1188 (10th Cir. Dec. 
27, 2016) (holding unconstitutional the manner in which SEC Administrative Law 
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the immigration context, we addressed the remedies available to al-
iens subject to unlawful government detention, holding that “the 
mandatory civil detention of criminal aliens under [8 U.S.C.] 
§ 1226(c) is constitutional for a reasonable period of time to com-
plete the removal proceedings, but” that “at some point such de-
tained aliens become entitled to an individualized bond hearing.”24 
This summary of 2016 would be incomplete without at least 
mentioning an election law development, given that this was a pres-
idential election year.  In a decision likely to reverberate beyond this 
past election cycle, we rejected a First Amendment challenge to an 
Alabama statute banning political action committees from raising 
money from other political action committees.25 
The articles in this 10th edition of the University of Miami Law 
Review’s Eleventh Circuit issue address timely, important, and di-
verse topics certain to be of interest to academics, practitioners, and 
the judiciary alike.  These topics include the Supreme Court’s role 
in developing admiralty and maritime law,26 the significance of our 
opinion addressing the scope of Title VII protections in the dread-
locks case, Catastrophe Management Solutions,27 and our Circuit’s 
treatment of Florida’s Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually 
Violent Predators Act.28  I trust readers will find that these commen-
taries provide illuminating insight into the present state and devel-
opment of the law in the Eleventh Circuit. 
                                                                                                             
Judges are appointed), with Raymond J. Lucia Co. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 280 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming the constitutionality of this process). 
 24 Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 25 Ala. Democratic Caucus v. Att’y Gen., Ala., 838 F.3d 1057, 1060, 1603 
(11th Cir. 2016) (“A law limiting contributions is valid ‘if the State demonstrates 
a sufficiently important interest’ and the law is ‘closely drawn’ to serve that state 
interest, even if there is a ‘significant interference’ with political association.” 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976))). 
 26 Michael Sevel, Lost at Sea: The Continuing Decline of the Supreme Court 
in Admiralty, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 938 (2017). 
 27 See infra n.21; D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs: The 11th Circuit’s Take 
on Workplace Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. Catastro-
phe Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987 (2017). 
 28 Lindsey Lazopoulos Friedman, Striking a Balance Between the Paramount 
Importance of the Safety of Children and Constitutionally-Imposed Limits on 
State Power, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1037 (2017). 
